Last October, a civil war broke out in Ethiopia between the Tigray ethnic group, located in the north of the country, and the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, which has already left hundreds of deaths and thousands of refugees. The conflict is a tangle of ethnic divisions, historical denials, and an inappropriate approach to modernization spurred on by third parties’ interests whose peaceful resolution seems far away.
On September 9, 2020, the Tigray region organized local elections after the central government’s decision to delay the national elections from March to August due to the coronavirus pandemic, although these were postponed again until May 2021. The vote, whose turnout was 97%, was declared illegal by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmeed while the TPLF, the region’s ruling party, said it no longer believed that he was legitimately in office as his mandate to govern had expired.
The government’s announcement sparked protests that escalated into violence. Both parties have accused each other of starting the conflict, although neither has shown solid evidence in this regard. As of today, deaths number in the hundreds – 207 during a massacre in the village of Bekoji, Benishangul-Gumuz on December 23 alone – and 33,000 refugees have fled to Sudan.
The Tigray election comes after months of severe unrest following the killing in late June, by unknown assailants, of Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer who gave voice to mass protests that paved the way for Abiy’s ascent to power but who also had a long history of critiquing different governments.
Although Tigrayans comprise only 6% of Ethiopia’s population, they have played a significant role in the country’s recent history, defeating the Derg, the Marxist-communist military junta of Mengistu Haile, and ruling the country from 1991 to 2012. Under the government of Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia embarked on building a carefully balanced ethnicity-based federal state, with a constitution that recognizes regional autonomy and the right to secession. There was also rapid progress, massive investment in infrastructure, and relentless economic success. Finally, the TPLF forces took the lead in the offensive against the invasion of neighboring Eritrea in 2000.
In 2012 President Meles died suddenly, passing the government baton to his deputy Hailemariam Desalegn until his resignation in 2018.
Members of the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups put their differences aside in opposition to a new Tigray mandate. Abiy Ahmed, a political chameleon with mixed Amhara and Oromo parentage, successfully manipulated ethnic divisions and took over the government with an agenda of political reform and national unification in hand. Two years in, the Prime Minister’s plans are derailing, and his initial dialogue stance is taking on a worryingly autocratic tone.
- Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic reality.
The most difficult challenge facing the Ethiopian government is to meet its goal of national unification, which is believed to be indispensable for the democratization and progress of the country. Ethiopia is made up of 80 ethnic groups of which 4 have significant political power, represented to date by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – the tetra-party coalition that has dominated politics during the TPLF era.
The political and historical claims of the major ethnic groups (Tigray, Amhara and Oromo) are conflicting. The Amhara consider that they are the rightful rules because they are descendants of the Solomonic dynasty and the last Ethiopian emperor, Haile Salasie, assassinated by the forces of the Derg in 1975. Amharic is the official language of the federal government, among the 100 languages that exist in the country.
The Oromo, the largest ethnic group (60% of the population), helped Abiy Ahmed to come to power in hopes that he would fulfil his promises to increase their presence in political decisions. Today, many Oromo consider that the Prime Minister has betrayed his word in favor of the Amhara, resurfacing a feeling of having been conquered, marginalized, and relegated to the periphery of Ethiopian history.
Tigrayans denounce being targeted and isolated by the new government. Indeed, since the beginning of his tenure, Abiy Ahmed has implemented measures to remove Tigrayan officers from position of power and to reduce their control of the navy. He has also freed political prisoners, allowed the return of dissidents, and signed peace with Eritrea, a milestone that won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. In the current war, the TPLF has accused Ahmed’s government of using this alliance to launch attacks on its territory.
Also, in 2019, the government promoted administrative centralization by creating the so-called Prosperity Party that dissolved the existing four-party coalition. The TPLF voted against as they say the coalition entails unconstitutional concessions.
During the last three decades, the Tigray, Amhara and Oromo groups have tried to consolidate their power over the minorities in ‘their’ own regions to varying degrees. These minorities have resented the political power of the larger or more powerful groups and are now beginning to demand regional status. Currently, there are at least thirteen ethnic groups demanding more autonomy, alliances outside the EPRDF are shifting, interests are aggregating, and battle lines are forming in contested areas.
Whatever the ethnic group, their elites are playing a fundamental role in the manipulation of identity discourses thus contributing to violence. The highest strata of society have been using the media to advance their political interests. This includes the Prime Minister himself, who until now had used it to win the praise of the international community and divert attention from pressing domestic issues.
- Inequality and economic forces
Defining the current civil war in Ethiopia solely on ethnic lines is reductionist. Growing inequality and the prioritization of the economy over other national interests are major sources of instability.
In recent years unemployment rates have skyrocketed, tax evasion and money leaks are pervasive, and law and order are rapidly deteriorating.
Massive protests over land grabs, evictions and home deductions have sprung up across the country due to mega-structural projects carried out without protecting the rights of citizens. Rather than grapple with the problems inherited from his predecessor, Abiy Ahmed has embarked on, or continued to build, new economic development plans.
Especially resounding has been the inauguration of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a structure of $4.5 billion that aims to boost the Ethiopian economy to the status of ‘middle income country’, but which has also caused regional tensions, especially with Egypt. Access to natural resources is often the subject of disputes in developing countries.
The problem also lies in the method of modernization that the government is implementing – a Western solution to a non-Western reality. Although western think tanks such as Foreign Policy have encouraged Abiy Ahmed to move beyond ethnic-based politics, ethnicity’s role in conflicts cannot be ignored or wished away. To a greater or a lesser degree, ethnic politics has been a perennial question in Ethiopia and a fuller understanding of the relationship between various collective identities and political and economic struggles is needed for stability.
- Third party infiltration.
The icing on the cake is the unconfirmed possibility that third parties are stirring up ethnic tensions in Ethiopia for their own interests in a traditional ‘Divide et Impera’ style.
The outbreak of violence undeniably benefits Egypt, which since 2011 has been negotiating with Addis Ababa for the construction and filling of the GERD dam, since its economy depends heavily on the Nile’s waters. In fact, the presidents of both countries came to exchange threats of direct conflict last August, which were later fanned by US President Donald Trump.
The civil war weakens Adiy Ahmed’s bargaining power and alleviates Egypt’s internal and regional situations. In addition, Cairo has investments worth $100 million in Tigray, one seventh of its total investment in Ethiopia. It would not be absurd to think that Egypt is using ethnic tensions to destabilize and debilitate Ethiopia.
UAE also benefits from turmoil as Addis Ababa’s commercial dependence on military supply would fit in with its overall designs on the region. For years now, Abu Dhabi has been establishing military bases in the Horn of Africa to try to offset the influence of its two main rivals – Iran and Qatar – in the Red Sea. More recently, the UAE has been wooing local Somali leaders to pressure the pro-Qatari Prime Minister’s government.
The most immediate beneficiary of the war is the Eritrean president Isseyas Afewerki, who shares a common enemy in the TPLF with Abiy. Despite his silence, he has allowed the Ethiopian Armed Forces to launch air strikes from Eritrea, turning the conflict from internal to transnational. Recently, eyewitness statements and military deserters have confirmed that Isseyas has indeed sent soldiers to Tigray.
Proxy-confrontations is further worsened by the continuous militarization of the horn region and the arrival of new actors such as China and Turkey.
International organizations have demanded the cessation of hostilities against civilians. The UN is striving to get a team on the ground to investigate alleged human rights violations. The Noble Prize board says it is watching the situation in Ethiopia very closely and is considering withdrawing the award from Abiy Ahmed if he is involved in crimes against human rights. The WHO (World Health Organization) leader, a Tigrayan, has been accused by the Ethiopian armed forces of supporting Tigray by facilitating the provision of arms, diplomatic support and lobbying.
- The way forward.
What is clear in this conflict is that an Ethiopian problem requires an Ethiopian solution – or at least a solution that fully understands the reality of the country and the Horn of Africa. There is no easy solution, but a strong centralized unitary governing system is unlikely to succeed in a multi-ethnic society like Ethiopia.
As a starting point, the country might find useful to consider Arend Lijphart’s consociationalism, which stands in contrast to the concept of ‘majoritarian democracy’ and calls for the integration of minority groups and the distribution of individual rights solely.
In the case of requiring international mediation, none of the countries with military bases in the Horn of Africa is an ideal intermediary since this would help advance their objectives of regional militarization. Sudan is the best positioned actor for the task, as it could maintain the fragile balance between all participants and would benefit from a peaceful resolution.
The more than 30,000 refugees who have crossed from Tigray into Sudanese territory represent an increase in national instability that Khartoum wants to stop. Egypt is Sudan’s historical ally, so it should also consider Cairo’s interests in the conflict. Furthermore, the Sudanese government could persuade Eritrea to soften its attitude towards Tigray by completing the normalization of relations between its borders.
As for the United Arab Emirates and Eritrea, the international community should employ more resources to monitor their movements in the Horn of Africa, stop looking away and firmly sanction their intervention in domestic politics.
Front image: Reuters.
Making Sense of International Politics 